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THE THIRTEEN DAYS BEFORE THE WAR
By ERICH OETTINGER
On the occa8ion of the jourth anniversary of the pruent world war we pub-
lished in our lase iB8ue an artiel8 entuled "SUCU811 oj TtL'O Mia8ionJI" whieh untJOtlered
.~ome of ehe bad'ground of this war. As a .wpplefmN and concluaion we now prueN
m~ urtide which grippingly conden.tu into a few pa(JU the dramatic eve7U8 oj eh8
laJJt thirteen dI.Jyll before the outbreak of the war on September 3, 1939. The a.tl1hor,
(I well·known German writer on politiCJl. 1uu ""ed all hia malenal the emire avoilable
pereit/ene literature. ineluding the oJtU;ial docume1llary publicotionll. With all itB
dranll.ltio pruetUatioll. hia work i8 fauhful to actual historical facta.-K.M.
Monday. AuqUBt 21. 1939
ONCE again the scorching, war-heavyheat of summer hung over Europe.It was August 21, 1939, and in
Berlin the International Archaeological
Congress, with representatives from thirty-
four foreign countries, was in session.
In its efforts to make use of even the
most modest opportunity for Anglo-
German understanding, the Berlin Com-
mittee of the German-English Society
had invited the English archaeologists to
an informal gathering at the Hotel
Esplanade. Among the guests there were
representatives of the German Foreign
Office as well as members of the British
Embassy, including the third secretary,
young Mr. Ross. The President of the
Society, who had left the room for a
moment, returned to the gathering and,
not without signs of agitation, said:
"Gentlemen, I have just heard a special
announcement on the radio. The agree-
ment with Russia has been settled!"
"Splendid!" exclaimed Mr. Ross and
slapped his knee-for he thought the
President referred to the planned pact
between Britain and the Soviet Union.
"But with Germany," replied the Pres-
ident, who perceived the misunderstand-
ing. "JVe have concluded a nonaggres-
sion pact with Russia! Foreign Minister
RibbeJltrop is flying to Moscow tomorrow
to sign it.' The gathering broke up soon
after.
Tue.sda,y, A u(JtI8t 22
The news of the pact struck the whole
world like a thunderbolt. The new policy
of encirclement against Germany had
suffered a serious defeat. On August 22
Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador-
to Berlin, received news from London that
Prime Minister Chamberlain was sending
a personal letter, written as a result of
the new situation, which Hendel' on was
to hand over without delay to Chancellor
Hitler, who was staying in Berchtesgaden.
How far away were the days of Munich[
Poland had been mobilized since March,
and England was rearming at top speed.
On his way to the airfield, Henderson
suddenly turned to the interpreter from
the Foreign Office who was accompanying
him and said with a bitter smile: "What
a joke! We have a military mission in
Moscow, and you make the agreement!"
Wednuday. Augu8t 23
While Ribbentrop was arriving in
Moscow, Sir Nevile Henderson's car drew
up at the Berghof, Hitler's residence at.
Berchtesgaden. The FUhrer sat down
with Sir Nevile and the accompanying
representatives of the German Foreign
Office at the great window of the recep-
tion room looking across the mountains,
to Salzburg. Without much preamble,
Henderson handed over the Prime l\1inis-
ter's letter, of which the Fuhrer already
possessed a translation and to which he-
said he would give a writt-en reply.
Thereupon the wily diplomat said:
"I hope a solution of the critical situa-
tion can be found; Britain fully appreciates
the fact that German-British co-operation
is necessary for the welfare of Europe."
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The Fuhrer replied that this should
have been realized sooner. Had it not
been for Britain, he would have come to
a peaceful understanding with Czecho-
slovakia in 1938 and the same would
have certainly been achieved now with
Poland in the Danzig question. Today
in Poland the Germans were being ill-
treated in every possible way, and this
becau'e Britain had given Poland a
blank cheque. He then described how,
at that very spot several months before,
<":olonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Milliliter,
had seen possibilities for a settlement on
the basis of the German proposals, a
settlement that had been made impossible
by Britain's interference. The FUhrer
went on to say that, at the least attempt
on the part of Poland to take further
action against Germany or against Dan-
zig, he would immediately intervene and,
furthermore, that a mobilization in the
west would be answered by a German
mobilization.
"Is that a threat?" Henderson asked.
"No, a protective measure!" replied the
Fiihrer, continuing to speak of the British
Covernment's determination to destroy
Germany. Sir Nevile protested that
Britain did not want to destroy Germany.
He argued that it was merely the prin-
ciple of force which she had opposed, in
reply to which the Fuhrer asked whether
Britain had ever found a solution for any
of the idiocies of Versailles by way of
negotiations. Henderson had nothing to
reply to this, and the FUhrer stated that,
according to a German proverb, it takes
two to make a friendship. With these
words he stood up.
By making his letter a personal one,
Chamberlain had chosen an outwardly
cordial form for his commmucation. Its
contents, however, lacked any under-
standing whatever for the German point
of view; indeed, it could almost be re-
garded as an effort at intimidation. The
letter made it quite clear that England
would permit no adjustment of the
Eastern problem among the Central and
Eastern European powers alone but in-
sisted on having a hand in this adjustment
although she had no direct interests in
these Eastern regions. While the Polish
terror, which had already been lasting for
months, was increu ing in vehemence
every day, the British Prime Minister
had no other suggestion to make than to
arrange for a truce during which steps
could be taken to examine and deal with
the complaints of the minorities. This,
he hoped, would lead to the establishment
of suitable conditions for direct negotia-
tions between Germany and Poland.
During the carly part of the afternoon
the Fuhrer dict.ated the final sentences of
his reply:
The question of the treatment of European
problems on a poo,ceful basis is not a dociBioll
which rests 011 Germuny but primarily on thoBe
who since the crime committed by the Versailles
dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed
any peaceful reviBion. Only Ilfter a change of
spirit on the part of the responsible Powers can
there be any real change in the relationship he-
twoon England and Germany. I have a.U IllY life
fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude
adoptoo by Dritiah diplomacy-at any rate up to
the present--has, however, convinced me of the
futility of such an attempt. Should there be any
change in thia respect in the future nobody could
be happier than 1.
At 4.15 p.m. Henderson received the
FUhrer's reply from his own hands at the
Berghof. AIter glancing at the two
pages, Sir Nevile folded the document
and placed it in his inner pocket. He
took his leave and turned to go.
"Is there no way of averting this
tragedy?" he asked.
"That is entirely up to your Govern-
ment," replied Adolf Hitler.
While the Fuhrer's reply was being
transmitted to London, Polish antiaircraft
guns near the borders of Danzig shot at
the German passenger plane Marschall
Bieberstein. On the samc afternoon an-
other German pa enger plane was shot
at by Polish antiaircraft batteries and a
Polish warship. On the fol.lowing day
there was a similar incident with the
German passenger plane D-AHHH. Per-
haps the Poles Buspected Foreign Minister
Ribbentrop of being in one of these
planes.
Friday, AUgu,8t 25
Hitler had returned to Berlin during
the night, and the news from Poland was
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getting more and more serious. N umer-
ous Polish divisions had appeared on the
German frontier, and the ring of Polish
troops around Danzig was tightening.
The persecution of the German minority
became more violent. In Kattowitz con-
trol had passed ov'might into the hands
of groups of Polish terrorists. All able-
bodied Germans were led off into the
interior. At Bielitz there had been shoot-
ing which resulted in eight dead and
seven seriou ly wounded. The list of
officially reported serious incidents on
the German-Polish frontier between Au-
gust 25 and 31, 1939, compiled by the
Germll.n Foreign Office on Septem ber 1,
includes forty-four items. The stream of
Germans escaping from Polish terror by
secret routes into Germany was swelling
hourly.
Henderson was informed that Hitler
wi hed to receive him at the Reich
Chancery at 1.30 p.m., where he was met
by the Fuhrer in hi tudy in the presence
of Ribbentrop. The FUhrer told Hender-
son that he desired to make a move as
regards England whi h should be as
deci ive as the move which had led to
the recent agreement with Russia. Before
revealing his plan, however, he referred
to the fact that both Prime Minister
Chamberhtin as well as Lord Halifax, the
Foreign Minister, had on tho previous
day made speech to the effect that
Germany wi hed to conquer the world.
This a sertion, be aid, was ridiculous-
the Briti h Empire embraced 40 million
square kilometers, Russia 19, America,
9! million, and Germany less than 600,000
square kilometers. It was quite clear
who wanted to conquer the world.
IIo !.hen d nit with tho Poliah prOVOOll-
tions. The German-Polish problem mu t
bo solved amI would be solved-but once
it waa soh'cd he would be ready to
approach England with a generous and
comprehensive olIer of a pact of friend-
ship and reciprocal guarantee. He then
handed the Briti h Ambas ador a memo-
ramlum which contained in rough outline
his propo ai, according to which the
solution of the G rman-Polish conflict and
a bu.sic agreement between Germany and
England would preserve world peace.
The Fuhrer requested the Ambassador not
only to telegraph his propoaal to London
but to fly there himself in order to leave
nothing undone to impress the British
Government with the urgency of the
German proposal. On the morning of
August 26, Henderson flew to London.
But in the evening of August 25
the British Foreign Minister and Count
Raczynski, the Polish Ambassador to
London, concluded an agreement of mu-
tual assistance, of which Article 1 ran
as follows:
Should one of t.he Cont.racting Parties become
engaged in hostilities with a European Power in
cOJUl(l(JucnC6 of aggNl88ion by lobe latter agaiWlt
that Contracting Party, the other Contracting
Party will at once give the Contracting Party
engaged in hostilities all the support and Wl8istance
in its power.
The fact that the words "European
Power" referred exclusively to Germany
was revealed on Ootober 19, 1939, by the
written reply made by Mr. Butler, British
Undersecretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, in answer to a question asked by
a Member of Parliament, whether the
obligations of mutual assistance contained
in the Anglo-Polish pact were to cover
the case of aggression made by non-
German Powers, including Russia:
No, Sir. During the negotiations whioh led up
to the signature of tho agreement, it was under-
stood below Il tho Polish Government and His
Maj ty's Government that lob agreement should
only cover the C88C of aggro88ioll by Germall)';
and the Govornment oonfirm that tltis is 80.
Was the conclu ion of this agreement
already the reply to Hitler's generous.
offer? The latter must in any case
al.r ady have arrived in London by tele-
graph. Even so, Berlin did not give up
hope that, in spite of the signing of the
Anglo-Polltill pauL, t.he new eitun,tion
created by the Fiihrer still left a possibility
of understanding open, the more so as
H nderson stayed in London for two
days and did not return to Berlin till
the evening of August 2 .
Mcnu:WY, .duUtU' 28
It took some time to translate the reply
of the Briti h Government to the Fuhrer's
proposal of Augu t 25 and to his letter
of August 23, so that it was 10.30 p.m.
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before Sir Nevile could hurry over t,o the
Reich Chancery. In his pocket he carried
the document that was to determine the
fate of the world for a long time to come.
The Fuhrer read the reply and observed
that he must study it carefully and
would give the Ambassador a written
reply the next day.
The gist of the British Government's
reply was, apart from some general
phrases regarding the praiseworthy rea-
sons which spoke for the Fuhrer's offer,
that England had under all cirCUJDsta,nces
to honor her word given to Poland (several
hours after Hitler had made his proposal!).
Thus the responsibility for the coming
developments-which had obviously al-
ready been discussed with the Poles in
London and Warsaw-was for the time
being shifted entirely onto the Poles.
Nevertheless, this formulation needed
some attenuation, and so the document
contained the new and constructive-
sounding suggestion that Germany and
Poland should open negotiations and
goes on to say:
[HiB Majesty's Government] have already roo
ceived a definite assurance from the Polish Govern·
ment that they are prepared to enter into dis·
cussions on this basis, and His Majcsty's Govern.
ment hope the German Government would for
their part also be willing to agree to this course.
So now suddenly the Poles, via London,
declared themselves prepared to negotiate.
Were they really serious, or was it simply
a new diplomatic move to shift the
responsibility for coming developments
onto Germany? Mter all, was there not
a Polish Ambassador in Berlin in the
person of Lipski? But although, on the
day after having handed over the memo-
randum of his Government containing
the rejection of the German proposals
(March 27, 1939), Ambassador Lipski
had promised to do everything in his
power to overcome the difficulties, he
had in the meantime not made the
slightest overture for direct negotiations.
The FUhrer was faced by the alterna-
tive of war or peace; with all that this
meant. But with brilliant penetration
he found for this complicated, or rather
artificially complicated situation an im-
mediate solution by reducing it to its
elementary facts: he was ready to nego-
tiate with Poland; but, now that it was
a matter of hours, not at the snail-like
tempo of a League of Nations, but lit
once. If they really wanted to negotiate,
they must be prepared to leave at once
for these negotiations. The sufferings
of the German population in Poland must
not continue a moment longer than
was absolutely necessary.
Tueaday, AUUtUt 29
In the late afternoon of August 29 the
British Ambassador once again faced the
Fuhrer and Ribbentrop in the Reich
Chancery and glanced through Adolf
Hitler's reply to the British Govern-
ment's counterproposal. He read:
For the rest, in making these proposals the
German Government have never had any intention.
of touching Poland's vital interests or questioning
the existence of an independent Polish State. The
German Government, accordingly, in these cir.
cumstances agree to accept the British Government'8
offer of thoir good offices in securing tho despatch
to Berlin of a Polish Emissary with full powers.
They count on the arrival of this Emissary on.
Wednesday, August 30, 1939.
Sir Nevile was taken aback at this
unexpected turn in his mission. The
hidden rocks in the British Government's.
note had clearly been avoided. He
asked: "If such a Polish plenipotentiary
did come [why "if," when the British
Government claimed already to have
Poland's assent to enter into discussions?],
will he be well reccived? Will the discus-
sions be conducted on a footing of com-
plete equality?"
He received an affirmative reply. The
discussions were to be held quite openly;.
but there must be no delay.
Wedlluday, Auguat 30
Another sunny August day dawned on,
Europe. The millions of people who
started it like any other day had no
inkling that the political developments.
in Berlin, London, and Warsaw were
rushing toward fateful decisions. With
growing anxiety, Hitler and Ribbentrop.
waited for Poland's reply.
They could well imagine what the
atmosphere in the Polish Foreign Office
was like. Since his visit to Berchtesgaden
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the Polish Foreign Minister Beck had,
aga.inst his better judgment, fa.llen more
.and more under the pressure of the
Army a.nd of public opinion which w&s
Jed by Poland's Anglo-Fra.ncophile press.
'The pa.cts with England had once again
·caused Polish nationalism, to which Po-
land owed her repeated resurrection, to
degenera.te into blind chauvinism. In
.spite of his insight into the situa.tion and
his dista te for the development striven
for oy the mil i ta.rists, Beck who laoked
true inner firmness let himself be borne
.along by the course of events.
Thu it is hardly surprising that tho
Fiihrer and Ribbentrop waited in vain
for news from the Poll h Government.
The day wore on noon ... afternoon ...
four o'clock five o'clock. No news.
.Then, at last, a telephone call from War-
.saw at 5.30 p.m. It W88 the German
·Cha.rge d'Affaires in Warsaw. The official
on duty at the German Foreign Office
took down the message: "Notices order-
ing a general mobilization have been
posted in Poland since 4.30 p.m. The
first day of mobilization is August 31."
'The Polish Army had been mobilized for
months-but there had not yet been
:this general mobilization. Now it had
occurred; and this was Warsa.w's answer
to Hitler's offer to negotiate with Poland.
What was the attitude taken by Po-
land's friends, France and England, to-
ward the ituation? The night before,
Monsieur Coulondre, the French Am-
bassador in Berlin, had telephoned to
his Foreign Minister in Pa.ris that he
.agreed with the British Amba.ssador in
that Poland should appoint. an emissary
in order to "show her good will in the
·eyes of the world. JJ But at the same
time he had added t.hat a journey of
Foreign ~finister Beck to Berlin wuuld
entail serious disadvantages, for tIle wurld
would regard it as a German success and
as a concession on the part of Poland.
And as for England: just before mid-
night on August 30, Henderson arrived
at the German Foreign Office. He had
intended to be there at 11.30 but at the
.last moment a dispatch from London
had arrived which had to be decoded.
Ribbentrop received the Ambassador in
the presence of Ministers Dr. Kordt and
Dr. Schmidt.
Sir Nevile handed over a memorandum
of tIle British Government and added
t.hat he had been instructed to discuss
two further points orally. He began by
stat.ing that reports were. current to the
effect that the Germans in Poland were
in part themselves responsible for their
persecution.
Ribbentrop objected strongly to this
remark. Germany, he said, was aware
only of acts of provocation committed
by the Poles, but Polish propaganda
appeared to have done its work with the
British Government. He refused to dis-
cus. this matter at all with the British
Government .
The British tactics were obvious: the
persecution of Germans in Poland gave
the German Government an indisputable
reason for demanding rapid action and
negotiations; in order to prevent early
negotiations the British had at first
represented the accusations as being
"exaggerated," and now that they could
no longer be denied before the world,
they were declared to be self-incurred.
(I n his memoirs, Henderson himself later
admitted: "1 have no doubt in my
own mind that the complaints of the
Germans in Poland probably had the
grea.ter foundation in fact.")
The Am bussador thcn came to his
second pOiJlt. He told the Foreign
Minister that the British Government
found it difficult to advise the Polish
Government to accept the procedure
adumbrated in the German reply. Trans-
lated from the language of diplomats
into that of clear facts, this meant no
Ie than that the British Guvernment
were against negotiatious beiug lJunducted
in Berlin. This was in complete con-
tracliction to the British Government's
declaration of August 28 accord.ing to
which they had obtained the Poli h
Government's definite consent to nego-
tiate. In order to gloss over this fact,
Henderson produced a new proposal:
that the German Foreign Minister should
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adopt normal contact, i.e., that when
the German proposals were ready the
Polish Ambassador be invited to call
and to hand him the proposals for trans-
mission to his Government with a view
to immediate opening of negotiations.
This new move of delay caused R.ibben-
tmp to remal"k bitterly that British
intervention had so far led to only one
tangible re ult namely, general mobili-
zation on the part of Poland. l\1icl11ight
had passed without an answer haying
been received in Berlin from the Polish
Government. The question of a pos. ible
proposal therefore no longer existed.
Nevertheles , Hibbentrop then read out
to the Brit,ish Ambassador the proposals
the German Government had been willing
to offer Polond. The most important of
these were:
The Free Cit,}' of Danzig to bo rot.urned forthwith
to the Reich.
A plebL~cito to clccide whether the Corridor
wss to become part of the Reich or remain with
l'olullli.
Gdynia to remain Polish, but to have, like
Danzig, a purely commerciltl character.
Should tho rosult of the plebiscite be in fayor
of Poland, Cennany to be given nn extraterritorial
tl'uJlio ZOlle to tleoure Cermany'>! unl'estrictou com·
municutiull wiLh ElLst Pru.ssia.
Should the roslllL of the plehiscite be in favor
of German~'. Poland to 11£1\'0 the Imme right of
bu.ilding un eXll'llLerrilorial roud and railway con·
ne·ot ion to socure her free access to her port of
Gdyrua.
'l'hursday, Augu t 3/
It was 2 a.m. Henderson had returned
to his Embassy and had telegraphed the
report of his interview with R.ibbentrop
to London. The situa.tion was most W1-
comfortable for his mi ·sioll. since a fur-
ther pre\-ention of contact between Po-
laud and Germany \I·uuld. tt::; a re ult of
Polish terror and the Poli ··h mobilizatioll,
lead to the outbreak of a \yur for which
England would bear the entire responsibil-
ity. So Henderson asked the Polish
Ambassador Lipski to call on him, hoping
thu at t.he la::;t momcnt to assume the
appearance f a rescuing mediator.
III the carly morning huw': of August
31 he ex pin illed to the Polish Am bassa-dor
the Germa.n pruposal::; for German-Polish
negotiations. 'In themsoh'es and at
their face value, the e proposals were not
unrea ouable and might well have erved
a a basis for negotiat.ion," I ir Nevile
later wrote in his memoirs. He suggested
to Lipski that the latter might recommend
to his Government that they propose at
once a meeting between Field l\ll1rshals
Smigly-Rydz and GoeriJ1g. Lipski agreed.
At the same hour at which the Polish
and British Ambassadors were having
their conversation. an attack was made
by Pules on the German frontier guard
011 duty u.t the customs hou e near
Gleiwitz.
At U.30 p.m. of the same day, Amba -
sadol' Lipski appearcd at the German
Foreign Office. tUter a moment's wait
in the reception room he was asked into
the IVlini ter's study. It was not yet
too late, but any hopes which the Uerman
Foreign Minister may have had were
dashed when Lipski declared: "Your
Excellency, I have an oral commmllcation
to make. The Polish Government have
received from the British Government
the news of the possibility of a direct
discussion between the German Govern-
ment and the Polish Co\'el'lll11cnt. The
Poli"h Government Are weighing the
proposal of the British Uovernment
favorably."
"Your Excellency," the German For-
eign Minister inquired, "I herewith a. k
you expressly: are you empowered to
negotiate? '
Europe s fate, uldeed, the fate of the
world, depended on the answer. It was:
"No."
The uncompromising nature of tills
reply seemed ulcredible to Ribbentrop.
and he made one last effort by aRking:
"Your Excellency, arc you able to eli. cuss
the matter with me?"
And again Lipski an wered: ' I O , I
am without plenary powers to do so."
This ended the conversat.ion.
In the evening of August 31 the Ger-
ma·n proposals which the Poles hud not
wanted to hear were broadcast. Toward
8 p.m., the German broadea ting station
at Gleiwitz a.nd the cu:tom' house of
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Hoflinden were attacked by Polish in-
surgents and temporarily ocoupied. Later
in the evening the customs building at
Neukrug was attacked by thirty Polish
soldiers armed with machine guns and
rifles. At other places two German cus-
toms officials were fatally injured and
one seriously. But the Warsaw radio
station reported at 11 p.m. :
Words can now no longer veil the aggressive
plans of the new Runs. Gel'ffinny is aiming at
the domination of Europe and is canceLLing the
rights of nllLions with 6S yet unprecedented cyni.
cism. This impudent proposal shows clearly how
necessary were the military orders briven by the
Polish Government.
Ff'iday, September 1
The limit of endurance had been
reached. England's and Poland's at-
titude was clear. On the morning of
September 1, the FUhrer issued a proc-
lamation to the armed forces in which
he Aaid :
TIle PoliBh state baa refused the peaceful settle·
ment of neighborly relations whioh I have striven
for; instead of that, it haa appealed to arms. The
Germans in Poland are being persecuted by bloody
terror, driven from their homes and fields. A
BOries of border infringement!', intolerable to a
great power, has proved that tbe Poles are no
longer willing to respect the German frontier. In
order to put an end to this lunacy, I have no other
choice LImn to IDOOt force with force lrom now on.
At the same hour the German armed
forces, taking over the active protection
uf Lhe Reich, marched into Polalld. At
a meeting of the Reichstag on the same
day, Hitler explained in detail the reasons
for his decision.
The British Foreign Office wired new
instructions to Henderson, on the basis
of which he requested another interview
with Ribbentrop. Meanwhile, the word
went out at the British Embassy to
"Burn! Burn everything quickly!" Soon
from the chimneys of the first of Britain's
diplomatic representations on the Con-
tinent rose the smoke of burning codes
and secret documents. Without waiting
for Henderson's meeting with Ribbentrop,
most of the mem bel'S of the British
Embassy appeared with their luggage at
the Hotel Adlon just arolmd the corner
from the Embassy.
At 0.30 p.m. Henderson stood. before
the German Foreign .l\tinister. He handed
him a communication from the British
Government which culminated in the
statement that His Majesty's Govern-
ment in the United Kingdom would
without hesitation fulfill their obligations
to Poland unless the German Government
were prepared to give His Majesty's
Government satisfactory assurances that
the German Government had suspended
aU aggressive action against Poland and
were prepal'ed promptly to withdl'aw
their forces from Polish territory.
Ribbentrop stated in reply to this that
it was not Germany who had attacked
Poland, but that on the contrary it was
Poland who had been provoking Germany
for months. Then he remarked that if
the British Government had been as
active vis-a-vis Poland as they had been
1 is-a-vis Germany, a settlement with
Poland would have been reached long
ago. The Fuhrer had waited a whole
day beyond the time limit set-Poland
had only replied by new and grave prov-
ocations.
Sir Nevile had no arguments to bring
forward against this. His mission, that
of preventing an understanding between
Poland and Germany and of bringing
about war, wu.s completed. He left. It
was his last interview with Ribbentrop.
At the last minute Mlissolini intervened
in the course of events. At 1 p.m. on
August 31 the Italian Foreign Minister
Ciano had informed the French Am uas-
sador in Rome that, if England and
France agreed, Mlissolini would invite
Germany to a confercnce on September 5.
On the following morning at 10.20 a.m.
the French Government a.ccepted this
proposal for a conforence, although the
German troops had by this tiwe already
been forced to cross the Polish frontier.
Sa~urda.y, Septembl!ir 2
On September 2 the FUhrer declared
his agrcement to the proposal, if the
British communication of September 1,
wltich had been followed by a French
one in the same vein, was not to be
regarded as an ultimatum. Mussolini
confirmed that it was only in the nature
of a warning. But at 5.20 p.m. Lord
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Halifax telephoned th French Foreign
Minister Bonnet: England would only
a.gree to the proposal of a conference on
ondition that Germany withdrew h l'
troop. How did Lord Halifax imagine
this to bo possible? How would he then
pI' \'ent the Pole from falling upon the
h Iple German min rity again? But
his condition was only a now move to
torpedo Mu solini' lu t attempt at peace.
Sunday, September 3
At 4 a.m. on September 3, instructions
w re rec ived at the British Emba y to
the effect that Henderson wa to call on
the GerJUftn ] oreign Minister at 9 a.m.
.pon conta.cting the German Foreign
OOice, he was informed that Minister
Dr. Schmidt hfLd been empowered to
I' cei"e any communi ation at the hour
indicated.
The interview took place in the study
of the Foreign Minister. • I have a
communication from my Government
to convoy," Henderson informed Dr.
'dunidt. Dr. Schmidt pI' ented his
plenipotentiary power to accept the docu-
ment. The communication of the British
Government again demanded th u pen-
'ion of aU aggressive action agaiJlSt
Poland and the withdrawal of German
forces from Polish territory and ended
with tho word :
unless not later than 11 a.m., Briti h ummet
Time, to·day 3rd September, sut is(actory as-
surances to the above effe I, have been given b
the German Government unci havo reach I His
Majesty's ovemm nt in London. a sl.ate o( war
will exiat between the two countri as (rom that,
hour.
That meant in two hours. H nd I' on
knew that he would I' eive no reply and
took formal leave of Dr. Sohmidt. At
11 a.m. the British Government informed
the Gel'mau ClI rge d Aiiaires in London
that a state of wur existed botween Great
Britain and Germany.
The French Ambas ador Coulondre had,
on his Government's instructions, acted
in the same way as Sir vile Henderson.
He had presente t a imilar ultimatum
that expired at 5 p.m. on this Sunday,
September 3, and to which he, too,
received no reply. France, having utter-
ly renounced h r political independence.
let herself be dragged without resistance
into thi Briti h war.
The war had como. The wave of im-
measurable uff· ring that wa to engulf
all mankind had started on its way.
